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Abstract 
When deciding where to invest, individuals choose mutual funds based on 
recent past performance, despite standard mandated disclaimers that "past 
performance does not guarantee future results." Investors would receive better long-
term returns by choosing funds with lower fees. We explored the impact of fees and 
past performance on realistic mutual fund selections across three preregistered 
repeated choice experiments (N=1,600), while manipulating the presence of 
disclaimers between-participants. Participants persistently chased past performance 
despite the opportunity to learn about the futility of this strategy during sixty repeated 
decisions with feedback. The standard regulatory-mandated disclaimer did not help 
most participants, compared to giving no advice at all, and was even counter-
productive for participants with low levels of financial literacy. An alternative 
disclaimer which explicitly highlighted the advantages of fee minimization reliably 
helped participants. We show how individuals who lack both financial literacy and 
prior investment experience are the most susceptible to making poor mutual fund 
choices, and can benefit the most from behavioral interventions such as the new 
disclaimer tested here. We discuss how these results generalize into real-world 
investment decisions, and how to design more efficient disclaimers that can be used 
beyond investment choices. 
 
Public significance statement: Even when presented with the standard 
mandated disclaimer that "past performance does not guarantee future results," 
individuals tend to choose investments based on recent past performance. This 
research shows how a new disclaimer is better at changing behavior so that investors 
disregard past performance and choose funds with low fees instead, which do tend to 
provide better returns on average. 
 
Keywords: investment decisions; behavioral finance; reinforcement learning; 
regulatory disclaimers; warning messages; financial literacy 
  
 
1 This research was funded by the Think Forward Initiative. A non-refereed report providing an early 
look at the results from Experiments 1a and 2 was published on the website of the funding agency 
(www.thinkforwardinitiative.com) entitled "Persistent chasing of past performance when selecting mutual 
funds.” 




Deciding on how to invest one’s money is among the most important decisions that people 
have to make, with long-lasting impact on their financial health. These decisions are not easy, as 
financial markets are dynamic, complex and data-rich, and most people lack the adequate financial 
literacy required to understand them (Hadar et al., 2013). Unsurprisingly, given such complex settings, 
research in behavioral finance has identified many psychological biases in relation to investment 
decisions (for reviews, see Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Shefrin, 2009). As a result, people often make 
suboptimal investment decisions, and research has shown that individual investors tend to earn poor 
long-term returns on their investments (Barber & Odean, 2013). Quite often, this is because of 
excessive expenditures in fees and other transaction costs (e.g., Barber & Odean, 2000). 
One challenging financial decision that individuals often make is investing in mutual funds. 
Mutual funds pool together money from many investors to buy a portfolio of stocks and bonds, 
providing simple solutions to help individual investors to access the financial markets with the added 
benefits of diversification. According to the Investment Company Institute (2019), an estimated 99.5 
million individuals in the United States own mutual funds, investing about half of their retirement 
wealth in them, as well as relying on them to fund education, healthcare, purchasing a house, or 
preparing for emergencies. Therefore, poor decisions when choosing mutual funds can be deleterious 
to an individual’s well-being across many domains of life. Choosing which mutual fund to invest in is 
not an easy process, with almost 10,000 mutual funds available for investors in the US, across different 
asset classes and objectives. 
The complexity of the decision process is amplified by the fact that, because of the efficiency 
and competitiveness of financial markets, when a specific fund outperforms its peers, it is largely just 
a matter of good luck (Carhart, 1997; Mercer et al., 2010) and short-lived (Bollen & Busse, 2005). 
Extensive research on historical market data has repeatedly confirmed that market prices are 
unpredictable, following what can be described as a random-walk process (Fama, 1995; Malkiel, 
1999). This means that mutual fund managers, who are responsible for selecting the investment 
strategy of a mutual fund, no matter how skilled or experienced, cannot knowingly buy any specific 
stocks or bonds which will provide better returns in the future than any other stocks or bonds (Fama, 
1970; Malkiel, 2003). Consequently, no individual fund can consistently and reliably beat the 
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competition (within the same risk profile).2 As the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) says, "past performance does not guarantee future results." 
Previous research on mutual fund selection 
Despite this regulatory warning, and the seemingly random nature of the financial markets, 
many investors do choose funds that have performed well recently (Sirri & Tufano, 1998). According 
to Black (1971), it is difficult for investors to convince themselves that the past history of market price 
movements do not contain any information that can be used to construct a consistently winning 
portfolio going forward. Because of such skepticism, some fund managers actively exploit the past-
performance bias, by selectively advertising funds that have performed recently well, by chance (as 
evidenced by the fact that the advertised funds do not maintain superior performance in the post-
advertisement period, see Jain & Wu, 2000; J. J. Koehler & Mercer, 2009). Fund managers also 
incubate multiple new funds to artificially (i.e., randomly) generate some funds with good past 
performance records, which are later promoted to clients, while the ones which performed badly are 
discarded (Evans, 2010). 
While individual funds cannot outperform the competition in terms of the returns of the 
stocks and bonds selected, there is one important factor in which funds can consistently be better 
than its peers: fees. In order to cover their running costs, mutual funds managers charge fees from 
their client investors, which average 0.55% of assets per year for equity mutual funds (Investment 
Company Institute, 2019). This might seem like a low percentage, but it equates to an expenditure of 
more than US$100 billion per year in the United States alone. One key differentiating factor in costs 
between funds is how the individual stocks and bonds are selected by the fund’s manager: actively or 
passively. Active fund managers constantly evaluate the markets for what they believe are the most 
attractive investment opportunities, trying to predict those which will outperform the market (with 
limited success, see Malkiel, 1995). For this added service, active funds are more expensive, charging 
0.76% per year on average, with some funds charging upwards of 2% per year. Passive funds provide 
a more standardized product which replicates market indices without trying to outperform them, by 
buying all the stocks and bonds contained in a chosen index (e.g., the 500 constituent stocks of the 
S&P 500 index). With this simpler (and more automated) strategy, passive funds can be cheaper, 
 
2 Funds that take more risk, for example, by choosing riskier investments, are expected to provide higher 
returns (in the long-run and with larger variance) than a fund that takes less risk. This is called the "risk premium" 
(Siegel, 1992), which compensates investors for higher risk-taking. So while a high-risk fund is expected to beat a low-
risk fund in the long-run, no individual fund within the same risk profile can be expected to consistently beat its 
competitors, without taking more risk. 
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charging 0.08% per year on average, with the first zero-fee index-tracking passive funds introduced by 
Fidelity Investments in the US in 2018.3 
There is no evidence that the higher fees of a more expensive fund will be compensated by 
higher returns (Daniel et al., 1997; Grinblatt & Titman, 1989). According to Malkiel (1999), a randomly 
selected portfolio of stocks can be expected to do as well as any professionally selected one (especially 
after accounting for the additional costs associated with active portfolio management). In fact, 
random portfolios have won many "competitions" against professional investors (e.g., Atkins & 
Sundali, 1997; Liang et al., 1995). Other comparisons show that active funds cannot consistently 
outperform passive funds in the long-run (Haslem et al., 2008), given that passive funds are cheaper 
on average. This is not to say that an expensive active fund always performs worse than its peers. 
Instead, it means that on average, they will perform worse more often than they will perform better, 
and any periods of better performance are not sustainable over the long-run (Black, 1971). A fund 
manager who was better than average one year has a lower than 50% chance of doing better than 
average the following year (Malkiel, 1999). 
Because cheaper funds are not as heavily burdened by the drag of definite (and negative) 
recurring fees, choosing the lowest-fee fund for any given asset class and risk profile (such as large US 
stocks) is a proven method to get above-average future performance (Elton et al., 2004; Haslem et al., 
2008; Volkman & Wohar, 1995). However, individuals tend to disregard costs when choosing 
investments, and end up overpaying for their investments with no added benefits for their extra 
expenditure (Choi et al., 2010; Fisch, 2010; Houge & Wellman, 2007). When asked to rate the 
importance of different fund selection criteria, most investors consider fees to be relatively 
unimportant (Capon et al., 1996; Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, 2014). It is therefore essential to investigate 
more about why many investors have not learned the truths about the irrelevance of past 
performance and the significance of fees in mutual fund selection. 
Laboratory studies designed to attempt to understand the past performance bias and nudge 
investors toward more fee-conscious strategies have found that past performance bias is remarkably 
robust. Choi et al. (2010) presented a group of educated and financially-literate Harvard staff members 
with a single-choice portfolio allocation task. Participants were later paid a financial bonus based on 
their chosen funds’ future returns. The choice was between four passive funds, which were all 
designed to track the returns of large US stocks represented in the S&P 500 index. These funds were 
strategically chosen by the experimenters, so that the highest-fee fund had the highest average past 
performance, creating an unrealistic positive correlation between fees and returns. Index funds 
 
3 The funds are called Fidelity ZERO Total Market Index (Symbol: FZROX), ZERO Large Cap Index (FNILX), and ZERO 
International Index (FZILX). 
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attempt to replicate the overall market return, so there is no reason to expect this chance 
outperformance to persist. Nonetheless, participants’ performance on this task showed a strong past 
performance bias favoring high-fee funds. 
Experimental research has attempted to understand the potential drivers of past performance 
bias. Discrete choice experiments (which ask participants to make a single choice) have confirmed that 
fees are given much less weight than past returns (Pontari et al., 2009; Wilcox, 2003). Converting 
percentages into corresponding monetary amounts has been shown to have limited effectiveness 
(Choi et al., 2010; Newall & Love, 2015). Other research has found that the current SEC mandated 
disclaimer did not help participants to minimize mutual fund fees, showing that more strongly-worded 
statements are needed (Mercer et al., 2010). The most effective alternative statement found thus-far 
appears to be one emphasizing the benefits of investing in low-fee funds, in comparison to other 
investors: "Some people invest based on past performance, but funds with low fees have the highest 
future results" (Newall & Parker, 2019). 
The psychology of past performance 
From a psychological point of view, being asked to disregard past outcomes when making 
future decisions can be difficult and counter-intuitive (Gureckis & Love, 2009b; Rakow & Miler, 2009; 
Tunney & Shanks, 2002). This is because past outcomes constitute an important component of 
decision-making strategies in most domains of life: individuals tend to pick the alternative that has 
provided the best outcomes in their past choices (Dayan, 2009; Edwards, 1961), and avoid the 
alternatives with poor past outcomes (Denrell, 2007; Denrell & March, 2001). This is the basic 
assumption behind most reinforcement-learning models, which posit that individuals accumulate 
experience by observing the outcomes associated with past actions, and evaluate this corpus of 
experience when considering future actions (Dayan & Niv, 2008; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Sutton & 
Barto, 1998). 
How far in the past an individual should look when considering their options depends on the 
environment (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). In static environments, the more information an individual 
can accumulate, the closer their knowledge will represent the true nature of the alternatives, 
facilitating the identification of the better choices (Fiedler, 2000; Rakow & Miler, 2009). However, 
information search can be costly (in terms of both time and effort), and when given the option to 
explore environments freely before making a decision, individuals often only gather a few limited 
samples of information, instead of exploring the environment ad nauseam, before making a decision 
(Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010; Plonsky et al., 2015). More information can also ultimately reduce cognitive 
understanding, given that more data needs to be kept in memory and processed (Fiedler, 2000). 
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This preference for smaller samples of information might show a human adaptability to more 
realistic dynamic environments (or simply boredom) and can even facilitate decision-making by 
increasing the saliency of the differences between the alternatives (Kareev, 2000). In dynamic 
environments, the structure of the outcomes can change over time, therefore relying on very old 
information (i.e., outcomes generated before the most recent structural change) can lead to incorrect 
decisions, since they are no longer representative of the current environment (Rakow & Miler, 2009; 
Plonsky et al., 2015). As a result, if the environment is always changing, it is beneficial to disregard old 
information and base one’s decisions on a smaller subset of the most recent outcomes. This creates a 
recency effect: the reliance on more recent outcomes, while discounting or completely disregarding 
old ones (Ashby & Rakow, 2014; Gureckis & Love, 2009b; Hertwig et al., 2004). The disadvantage is 
that small samples can be biased, creating divergences from the true nature of the outcomes, which 
can lead to biased decisions (Fiedler, 2000). 
An extreme example of the recency effect is the win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) decision heuristic. 
This is a very simple strategy that does not depend on long-term memory and focuses only on the 
most recent information (Biele et al., 2009) and does not require any learning (Worthy, Pang, & Byrne, 
2013). Individuals who follow a WSLS strategy stay with their chosen alternative if its most recent 
outcome “won” in comparison to others, or shift to another alternative if it “lost.” While WSLS is a 
poor strategy in many decision making spaces (Lee et al., 2011; Shanks et al., 2002), it seems to be 
widely employed (Otto et al., 2011; Worthy, Hawthorne, & Otto, 2013), probably because of its 
frugality. 
These decision-making strategies can explain the past performance bias observed in mutual 
fund selection (Choi et al., 2009). It is likely that investors take a perfectly valid decision cue from other 
environments (past performance), but apply it inefficiently to an environment in which it is not valid 
(investment decisions). Given the dynamic and complex nature of the financial markets, it would be 
reasonable to expect that individuals employ strategies aiming to simplify the environment and reduce 
cognitive load, by focusing only on more recent outcomes (Hills et al., 2013; Payne et al., 1988). Such 
preference for small samples might explain why individuals seem to invest based only on recent 
experience, rather than a more comprehensive totality of accumulated experience (Rieskamp, 2006). 
However, because an expensive fund might randomly outperform others in short spells (Bollen & 
Busse, 2005), it might not be possible to observe that cheaper funds outperform their expensive peers 
based only on small samples. As a result, choosing funds based on recent past performance is a 
suboptimal strategy. 
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Overview of experiments 
The extant research on mutual fund selection suffers from two major limitations, which we 
address in our current research. First, the majority of research in this area employs single-choice 
paradigms. Participants are typically shown information about a set of mutual funds, and are asked to 
make a single selection in which to invest. These single-choice experiments do not allow for 
participants to learn from their choices. This limitation is relevant, given field evidence that investors 
learn to invest based on how assets perform over time (Choi et al., 2009). Real investment decisions 
are similar to repeated decisions with feedback: Individuals act on the feedback they receive from the 
performance of their investments (Benartzi & Thaler, 1999). With a repeated-choice decision task we 
are able to track the decisions over time, and evaluate how individuals integrate past performance 
information into their decisions. 
Second, and not unrelated to the first limitation, single-choice experiments create another 
problem which potentially undermines ecological validity. Single-choice experiments have often 
forced a positive relationship between fees and past performance, in order to create a testable trade-
off hypothesis between fee-minimization and performance bias (e.g., Choi et al., 2010; Fisch & 
Wilkinson-Ryan, 2014; Mauck & Salzsieder, 2017; Wilcox, 2003, but see also Pontari et al. 2009, for an 
exception). Critically, and jeopardizing the generalizability of the findings, this is not a representative 
design (Dhami et al., 2004). In reality, for mutual funds representing any given asset class, there exists 
a negative relationship between fees and performance: cheaper funds are better in the long run 
(Haslem et al., 2008; Volkman & Wohar, 1995). This negative relationship is not clearly observable in 
the market due to survivorship biases arising because poorly-performing high-fee funds are frequently 
closed by mutual fund providers (Brown et al., 1992; Dukes et al., 2006; Evans, 2010). If participants 
never observe the low-fee fund outperform the high-fee fund, there is an even weaker rationale for 
choosing them, which might inflate the past performance bias observed in previous research with a 
forced positive correlation. 
Here we present a set of three repeated-choice experiments correcting for these limitations. 
We asked large and diverse samples of individuals (N=1,600) both with and without prior personal 
investments in stocks and with a wide range of financial literacy to make 60 consecutive incentivized 
mutual fund investment decisions choosing between two funds based on historical market data. Our 
results are also relevant to the whole mutual fund market, exploring patterns of error across both 
passive and active funds. We introduce random noise, generating within-subjects variation in fund 
performance as, in real life, each fund can deviate from its benchmark. The random noise also 
eliminates any short-term positive correlation between fees and past performance, introducing 
instead a small negative long-term correlation; the low-fee fund outperforms the high-fee fund slightly 
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more than 50% of the time. By presenting a low-fee fund which can outperform the high-fee fund, 
and by using a repeated-choice task which allows participants to learn from their choices, we will be 
able to test the robustness of the past performance bias in a more challenging (and realistic) setting. 
We test the influence of two disclaimers on reducing past performance bias, including a disclaimer 
which provides directed clues identifying optimal behavior (Fu & Anderson, 2008; Yechiam et al., 
2001). A brief cognitive model comparison explores different ways in which past performance can be 
used to inform investment decisions (Rieskamp, 2006). 
Methods 
In three preregistered experiments, we investigated the extent to which investors use past 
performance or management fees when choosing between two simulated mutual funds.4 Participants 
were asked to choose between one low-fee and one high-fee fund, repeatedly, for 60 trials. Each trial 
represented one month of investment based on real historical market returns. Apart from the 
difference in fees, the returns of the two funds were generated dynamically by the same underlying 
(but independently implemented) stochastic process: the S&P 500 index returns perturbed with a 
trendless random noise component. Because the noise had a mean of zero, both funds had the same 
expected gross performance (before fees) in the long run, even if they differed every month. 
Participants were compensated financially according to the returns of the funds they selected. 
All three experiments were between-subjects designs, manipulating a disclaimer which was 
presented (or not) before participants started selecting funds. Experiment 1a had two experimental 
conditions. In the standard condition, participants saw an industry standard disclaimer used when 
marketing mutual funds, which said "Past performance does not guarantee future results." In the no-
disclaimer condition, participants saw a neutral message instead: "Please click the button below when 
you are ready to start the task." Experiments 1b and 2 repeated the two conditions from Experiment 
1a and added one additional experimental condition, the social condition: "Some people invest based 
on past performance, but funds with low fees have the highest future results," a disclaimer first used 
in Newall and Parker (2019). 
Participants 
A total of 1,600 participants were recruited on-line using Prolific Academic across three 
experiments. Participation was restricted to United States nationals. We filtered participants 
according to a pre-screening question captured by Prolific Academic: "Have you ever made 
 
4 The experimental materials, JavaScript code, raw data, and full data analysis scripts in R can be found online in Open 
Science Framework (OSF) at https://osf.io/k8us3. The tasks were preregistered at https://osf.io/k8us3/registrations. 
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investments (either personal or through your employment) in the common stock or shares of a 
company?" Experiments 1a and 1b captured experienced participants who had answered "yes" to that 
question while Experiment 2 captured inexperienced participants who had answered "no." 
Participants were not allowed to participate in multiple experiments. In addition to a fixed amount of 
US$2.50 for completing the task, participants were paid a performance bonus, which was based on 
the accumulated returns of the funds they selected (M=US$4.30, SD=1.68, range=[0, 11.70]). Nine 
participants ended with a negative bonus, which was not taken from their fixed payment. The study 
received ethical approval by the City University London Research Ethics Committee reference 
ETH1819-0392.5 
Experiment 1a: Prior investments and index funds 
We recruited 400 participants who had made prior investments in stocks and shares (130 
females; age: M=36.7 years, SD=11.6 years), 200 in each of the two disclaimer conditions (none and 
standard). No participants were excluded from the analysis. 
Experiment 1b: Prior investments and active funds 
We initially recruited 600 participants who had made prior investments in stocks and shares, 
200 in each of the three disclaimer conditions (none, standard, and social). As per the preregistered 
procedure, one participant from the social condition was excluded for completing the task in less than 
2 minutes (261 females; age: M=37.8 years, SD=12.0 years). 
Experiment 2: No prior investments and index funds 
We initially recruited 600 participants who had not made prior investments in stocks and 
shares, 200 in each of the three disclaimer conditions (none, standard, and social). Four data-sets, 
from two participants, were excluded as each individual completed the task twice, two from the social 
and two from the standard condition (341 females; age: M=32.5 years, SD=12.6 years). 
Task 
The experiment started with a short introduction to mutual funds, including the fact that they 
charge management fees, which are paid regardless of performance. Participants were told that they 
would be asked to choose between two similar mutual funds. They were told that the returns shown 
were based on actual historical data, and that the two funds were closely related to a broad US-index, 
the S&P 500, which was also briefly described. In Experiments 1a and 2, the funds were described as 
 
5 Authors LWC and PA were at City University London when the data was originally collected. 
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index-tracking funds, which aimed to closely match the S&P 500 index; in Experiment 1b, the funds 
were described as actively managed funds, which aimed to outperform the S&P 500 index by as much 
as possible. Full instructions can be found in Appendix C. 
After the instructions were read, a disclaimer was shown on screen, the wording of which 
depended on the experimental condition, as explained above. This was the key manipulation for the 
task. To increase awareness of the disclaimer, participants were asked to acknowledge that they read 
the disclaimer by clicking a button before continuing. The disclaimer remained on screen throughout 
the task (Figure 1A). 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Participants had to choose between a low-fee fund and a high-fee fund, 60 times. In 
Experiments 1a and 2, the low-fee and high-fee funds had annual management fees of 0.1% and 0.7% 
respectively; in Experiment 1b, the fees were 0.5% and 1.5% respectively. The lower figures were 
chosen to be close to the asset-weighted averages, and the higher figures were close to the simple 
averages, of index equity mutual funds (Experiments 1a and 2) and actively managed mutual funds 
(Experiment 1b) according to Investment Company Institute (2019, p.120). The management fees for 
each fund were always on display underneath each fund. All returns shown to participants were net 
of fees, and this was clearly indicated in the instructions. 
Before their first selection, participants were shown a historical 12-month return for each fund 
(Figure 1A). These returns were calculated using the actual monthly S&P 500 returns for the 12-month 
period from December 2012 to November 2013, plus a random noise component, minus fees, which 
will be explained below. The accumulated S&P 500 return for the historical period was 24.90%. 
Participants were instructed that this historical return would not count towards their accumulated 
bonus. After participants made their first selection, these historical returns were removed from the 
screen. This first trial mirrored the extant mutual fund experiment literature (e.g., Choi et al., 2010), 
where choices are made based upon historical returns; in comparison, the remaining 59 choices were 
based on experienced returns - which counted towards participants’ bonuses. 
After each selection, participants were shown the net returns for both funds (full feedback, 
Figure 1B). The task involved 60 trials, each representing one month of real historical market data. The 
monthly returns for each fund were calculated dynamically, based on the S&P 500 returns for the 
period of 60 months from December 2013 to November 2018. The accumulated S&P 500 return for 
the 60 months was 45.04%. For each fund i, its monthly return for time t (Reti(t)) was calculated by 
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taking the index return for that month (SP(t)), adding a noise component N(0,σe), and deducting the 
relevant monthly fees (Feei):  
 
Reti(t) = SP(t) + N(0,σe) − Feei. 
 
The noise component was stochastically generated, independently for each fund, from a 
normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation of σe. Because the mean of the noise 
component was zero, the only long-term expected difference between the two funds was the 
difference in fees. This gives an expected advantage to the low-fee fund, mirroring real world mutual 
fund returns (Carhart, 1997). The standard deviation of the noise (σe) was the same for both funds 
within each experiment, but changed according to experiment. They were chosen based on a database 
compiled by Petajisto (2013)6 which calculated the noise of the difference in returns of 2,647 mutual 
funds from their respective benchmarks (which, in the case of the funds used here, it is clearly 
identified as the S&P 500 index.) In Experiments 1a and 2, which described index-tracking funds, σe 
was 2% for both funds (per month), which matches the 90th percentile of index fund noise according 
to Petajisto (2013). While most index-tracking funds have very low noise relative to their benchmarks, 
it is not uncommon for poorly managed funds to achieve noise of 1% per month or higher (see also 
Frino & Gallagher, 2002; Frino et al., 2004; Israelsen & Cogswell, 2007). The 90th percentile for index 
funds was chosen to generate dispersion in the returns every month - by using the median the noise 
would not have been variant enough, and the differences in past performance might have been too 
small to reliably observe any behavioral biases. In Experiment 1b, which described actively managed 
funds, σe was 2.5% for both funds, which matches the 50th percentile of noise of non-index funds also 
in Petajisto (2013). Any potential concerns that Experiments 1a and 2 are not representative designs 
for employing extreme examples of passive funds, can be assuaged by the extent to which convergent 
results are found in Experiment 1b, which more closely reflects typical actively-managed funds. 
Participants were paid a bonus of US$1 for each 10% of accumulated bonus, pro-rata. Each 
month’s simulated returns for the fund that the participant had chosen were added to their 
accumulated bonus, which started at zero. To simplify the task, returns were simply added, not 
compounded. This is because investors misunderstand exponential compounding (Stango & Zinman, 
2009), especially when there are both positive and negative returns (e.g., an increase of 50% followed 
by a decrease of 50%), as they underestimate the level of asymmetry in growth processes (Ensthaler 
et al., 2018), making it harder to track how each additional return contribute to their final position. In 
addition, as one cannot compound from a starting point of zero, compounding would require the 
 
6 www.petajisto.net/data.html. 
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temporary loaning to participants of an initial monetary endowment, potentially introducing 
unnecessary complexity and endowment effects. The amount they earned was similar to realizing any 
gains or losses after every month, instead of capitalizing the returns. Accumulated performance in 
percentage and monetary bonus equivalent was always present on screen. 
After finishing the fund selection task, participants completed the 13-question financial 
literacy questionnaire from Fernandes et al. (2014). There was no significant difference in financial 
literacy scores for participants in Experiments 1a and 1b (Exp1a: M=10.09, SE=0.13, Exp1b: M=9.80, 
SE=0.11; t(1592)=1.68, p=.21). Perhaps because they had prior personal experience investing in stocks, 
participants in Experiments 1a and 1b scored significantly higher than participants in Experiment 2, 
who had never made investments in stocks (Exp2: M=7.84, SE=0.11, both pairwise ps<.001 against 1a 
and 1b).7 On average, the task took 10.26 minutes to complete (SD=5.53). 
Results 
The dependent variable analyzed was the selection from the low-fee fund, a binary variable. 
Higher is better, as selecting more often from the low-fee fund reduced fees and resulted in higher 
returns.8 The aim of the preregistered analysis was to compare the frequency of selection from the 
low-fee fund according to the different disclaimer messages. 
There were four preregistered independent variables: (1) the disclaimer messages; (2) 
differences in returns between the two funds, calculated as the returns from the low-fee fund minus 
the returns from the high-fee fund, with positive values meaning that the low-fee fund performed 
better than the high-fee fund by that amount; (3) financial literacy scores, which varied between 0 
and 13, with higher scores indicating higher financial literacy; and (4) trial number, which measures 
how fund selection behavior changes over time. 
Two separate analyses were conducted. Both analyses used generalized linear models with a 
binomial-logit link function. Our main research interest was in the repeated decisions from experience 
and if they would be influenced by the differences in returns in each previous trial. This was conducted 
using a repeated-measures mixed-effects analysis, for trials 2-60. The model contained one within-
subjects repeated measure, which was the trial number, one between-subjects factor, which was the 
disclaimer message, and two covariates: previous trial return difference, and financial literacy scores. 
The model included a random slope for trial number and a random intercept for each participant: the 
random intercept allowed for individual differences in the base level of low-fee fund preferences, and 
 
7 Two questions (7 and 11) were related to mutual funds. Eliminating these questions from the analyses does not change 
any of the findings (detailed results in OSF). 
8 There was a positive significant correlation between frequency of selection of the low-fee fund and amount of 
monetary bonus received (r(1593)=0.081, p=.001). 
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the random slope accounted for individual differences in the change to low-fee fund selections across 
trials (equivalent to learning). 
Because in the first trial participants did not have any previous trials in which to have 
experienced returns, but instead were provided with historical returns covering 12 months, we 
analyzed the first trial separately. This replicates previous research in which subjects are asked to 
make a single decision based on historical past returns. The between-subjects factor was the 
disclaimer, with two covariates: the 12-month historical difference in returns and financial literacy 
scores. Only the main effects and first order interactions were included in both models, which were 
analyzed using ANOVAs for the categorical disclaimers and regression coefficients for the continuous 
independent variables. 
Changes from preregistered analyses 
We originally preregistered all the results to be extracted from ANOVA tables, including the 
coefficients of the continuous variables which would be calculated using estimated marginal means. 
We subsequently found it more helpful to present the coefficients and results directly from the 
underlying regressions (upon which the ANOVAs were to be based), especially for the continuous 
independent variables (i.e., trial number, difference in returns, and financial literacy scores), as 
coefficients can show direction and magnitude. In order to facilitate the presentation and 
interpretation of the regression coefficients, two changes from the preregistered analyses had to be 
made. First, a treatment contrast was used for comparing the differences between disclaimer 
messages, instead of the proposed Helmert contrast. This approach provides a comparison between 
the two different messages against the no-disclaimer condition as a control. Second, the three 
continuous variables were mean-centered, by subtracting the mean of each variable from each 
observation. Mean-centering converts all the coefficients to those of an individual with mean financial 
literacy scores (instead of a score equal to zero, which would not be as useful), when the difference in 
returns are zero, and at the middle point of the task (trial 31, instead of trial zero, which did not exist). 
This transformation is particularly useful when interpreting interactions. We still present the ANOVA 
results for the categorical variable (disclaimer messages) in the main manuscript, and the full ANOVA 
table is in Table A1 in Appendix A. The changes to the contrast and the mean-centering of variables 
do not significantly change results obtained from ANOVA tables, and the use of regression tables 
instead of ANOVAs do not alter any of the findings or conclusions presented here. 
Past performance bias 
At every trial, across all three experiments, we observe past performance bias, with 
participants selecting more often the fund that had the highest returns at each previous trial (Table 
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1(B): Difference in returns). This effect was also observed in the first trial with participants preferring 
the fund with the highest 12-month historical past performance (Table 1(A): Difference in returns). 
The slope coefficients for the differences in returns in the regression table are the change in log-odds 
of the probability of selecting the low-fee fund for changes in the difference in past returns between 
the two funds: a positive slope represents past performance bias, with an increase in selections of the 
low-fee fund when it outperforms the high-fee fund. The probability of selecting the winning fund was 
also influenced by the magnitude of the difference in returns: when a fund outperformed the other 
by a larger amount, the probability of it being selected in the trial increased (Figure 2). 
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
There was a significant and negative interaction between past performance and financial 
literacy in the repeated trials of Experiments 1a and 1b but not in Experiment 2 (Table 1(B): Difference 
× Fin. Lit.). Increases in financial literacy were associated with a reduction in past performance bias. 
Participants with higher financial literacy performed better in the task, with lower performance bias. 
For participants with the highest financial literacy scores (11 to 13), the past performance bias was 
nearly eliminated, with almost flat curves, as can be seen in Figure 2. This was only observed in the 
first two experiments in which participants had prior personal experience with stock markets, but not 
in the last experiment with less experienced participants. In Experiment 2, financial literacy levels did 
not change past performance bias. As we will discuss later, we believe that this is because both prior 
experience of financial markets and high financial literacy are crucial to reduce past performance bias 
- which was the case for participants in Experiments 1a and 1b but not in Experiment 2. The interaction 
between past performance and financial literacy was not significant in the first trial in any of the 
experiments (Table 1(A): Difference × Fin. Lit.), suggesting that experienced participants were better 
able to learn over time through repeated experience and improve their choices. 
Influence of disclaimer 
There was no overall main effect of disclaimer in Experiment 1a, in the repeated trials, with 
no difference in selections between no disclaimer and the standard disclaimer (Exp.1a: χ2(1)=0.50, 
p=.48). Participants chose the low-fee fund as frequently with the standard disclaimer as with no 
disclaimer (Exp. 1a: none=86.4%, standard=83.5%). This lack of significant differences between no 
disclaimer and the standard disclaimer was also observed in Experiments 1b and 2 (Table 1: 
Disclaimer=standard), showing that the standard disclaimer does not help improve fund selection in 
relation to no disclaimer (Exp. 1b: none=79.2%, standard=78.4%; Exp. 2: none=65.9%, 
standard=66.3%). The same lack of effect was observed in the first trial of Experiment 1a (Exp.1a: 
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χ2(1)=0.79, p=.38). The regression results in Table 1 (Disclaimer=standard) show a lack of significant 
changes to low-fee fund selections with the standard disclaimer in comparison to the control, across 
all experiments and all trials. 
There was however a significant main effect of disclaimer in the repeated trials of Experiments 
1b and 2, due to the addition of the social disclaimer (Exp.1b: χ2 (2)=21.15, p<.001; Exp.2:  χ2(2)=79.83, 
p<.001). The social disclaimer helped participants choose the low-fee fund significantly more often 
than no disclaimer, across both experiments with a social disclaimer (Exp1b: social=91.0%; Exp2: 
social=89.4%). The same effects were observed in the first trial for Experiments 1b and 2 (Exp.1b: 
χ2(2)=26.57, p<.001; Exp.2: χ
2(2)=21.48, p<.001). 
In the repeated trials across all three experiments, the interaction between disclaimer and 
previous trial difference was significant (Exp.1a: χ2(1)=17.43, p<.001; Exp.1b: χ2(2)=14.69, p=.001; 
Exp.2: χ2(2)=21.19, p<.001). In Experiments 1a and 2, this was due to the flatter slope coefficient for 
previous trial difference with both disclaimers, indicating that past performance bias was lower when 
there was a disclaimer and the funds were passive with lower noise (Table 1: Disclaimer=standard × 
Difference and Disclaimer=social × Difference). On average, the presence of both disclaimers reduced 
past performance bias in relation to no disclaimer, flattening the curve, but did not completely 
eliminate it. However, we observed a different effect in Experiment 1b, in which the standard 
disclaimer increased the past performance bias for repeated trials from experienced investors 
choosing between actively managed funds (Table 1(B), Exp.1b: Disclaimer=standard × Difference). This 
is the opposite of the desired effect for the disclaimer. This reversal was not observed in the first trial 
(Table 1(A), Exp.1b: Disclaimer=standard × Difference), which indicates that perhaps participants 
learned this behavior as the task progressed, by believing that any outperformance of a fund in one 
trial would repeat in the next trial, perhaps due to the active fund manager’s skill. 
The interaction between disclaimer and financial literacy was significant in the repeated trials 
for Experiments 1a and 2, but not significant for Experiment 1b (Exp.1a: χ2(1)=6.79, p=.009; Exp.1b: 
χ2(2)=3.88, p=.144; Exp.2: χ2(2)=10.68, p=.005). The slope coefficient is the change to the logs-odds for 
the probability of selecting the low-fee fund for every additional correct answer in the financial literacy 
score. In the repeated trials of Experiments 1b and 2, we observed a significant increase in the slope 
for financial literacy with the social disclaimer (Table 1(B): Discl=social × Fin. Lit.). Participants with 
high financial literacy reacted to the social disclaimer more, choosing more often from the low-fee 
fund. This trend was also observed in Experiment 1a, but with the standard disclaimer (Table 1(B): 
Discl=standard × Fin. Lit.). This interaction was not significant in the first trial of any of the experiments. 
It seems that the disclaimers had a different effect according to the level of financial literacy, creating 
a wider differentiation between participants than when there was no disclaimer. The side effect of 
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this wider differentiation is that while it leads to participants with higher financial literacy choosing 
the low-fee fund more often, it also leads to participants with lower financial literacy choosing the 
low-fee fund less often. In the case of the standard disclaimer, which did not cause an overall increase 
in the selection of the low-fee fund, it was associated with an adverse effect for low financial literacy 
participants, causing them to select the high-fee fund more frequently, and was only beneficial to 
participants with prior experience and high financial literacy, as can be seen in Figure 2. In contrast, 
the social disclaimer was associated with higher selections of the low-fee fund for all participants (but 
more so for participants with higher financial literacy). 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Learning from experience 
There was a significant effect of trial number, in all three experiments, indicating that 
participants were selecting the low-fee fund more often as the task progressed (Table 1: Trial number). 
The slope coefficient is the change to log-odds of the probability of selecting the low-fee fund for each 
100 trials. However, the small coefficients translate to a relatively small (albeit statistically significant) 
increase in selections of the low-fee fund of around 5-10 percentage points over the 60 trials of the 
task. Overall there is some indication of learning, but it appears to have been limited, and did not 
completely eliminate past performance bias over the course of the task. We explore how learning 
might have occurred in more depth in the next section using cognitive modelling. 
Cognitive modelling 
In the experimental results presented above, the fund selected at each trial was influenced by 
the past performance from the previous trial. If past performance is influencing mutual fund 
selections, then a cognitive model which also relies on past performance should be able to correctly 
predict each participant’s behavior. By using competing models which accumulate and integrate 
information in different ways, we can further evaluate how learning processes and past performance 
influence mutual fund choices (Rieskamp, 2006). This additional analysis was not pre-registered, and 
was conducted after the statistical analyses. 
We tested two competing models which rely on past information, which have been compared 
before to evaluate repeated decision-making between risky gambles with gains and losses (Worthy, 
Hawthorne, & Otto, 2013; Worthy, Pang, & Byrne, 2013). Each model considered a different horizon 
of past information: the reinforcement-learning (RL) model combines long-term past information from 
all previous trials, while the win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) model only considers short-term information 
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from the most recent previous trial. We also tested a low-fee model, which always selected the low-
fee fund, which is the optimal behavior and the ultimate objective of the disclaimers tested in our 
experiments. All models were compared to a base naive random model, which assumed random 
selections between the two funds, and describes the simplest and most basic behavior possible. The 
models are described in more detail in Appendix B. 
Reinforcement learning model 
Reinforcement learning models assume that individuals calculate and store an expectancy 
value for each available alternative (Sutton & Barto, 1998). These expectancies summarize all the 
information observed so far, and are updated after every trial, using a learning rule. We have chosen 
the expectancy-valence (EV) model with its delta-learning rule, which has been shown to explain 
behavior well in many different types of risky decision-making studies (Gureckis & Love, 2009b; 
Speekenbrink & Konstantinidis, 2015; Yechiam & Rakow, 2012). Expectancies are updated by a model-
fitted proportion of the prediction error, which is calculated as the difference between the latest 
observed outcome and the previous expectancy. A ratio choice rule is then used to determine the 
probabilities of choosing each alternative according to the relative values of their expectancies 
(Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005). If one alternative has a much higher expectancy, it will be chosen with 
higher probability. If two alternatives have similar expectancies, then they are chosen with equal 
probability. 
Win-stay-lose-shift 
In contrast to RL models, which require memory and cognitive effort to calculate expected 
outcomes after every trial, the WSLS model is a much simpler heuristic-based model, which requires 
little cognitive effort and does not involve learning or memory (Worthy & Maddox, 2012). The WSLS 
model assumes that individuals only look at the difference in values of the most recent previous trial. 
It simply states that individuals stay with their chosen option if it "wins," or shift away to another 
option if it "loses" (Worthy, Hawthorne, & Otto, 2013). At every trial, the model starts by comparing 
the performance of the two alternatives in the previous trial. If the previously chosen alternative is 
better than the unchosen one, then the model chooses the same alternative with a model-fitted 
probability of staying. If the previously chosen alternative was worse than the unchosen one, then the 
model chooses the unchosen alternative with a model-fitted probability of shifting. 
The random and low-fee models 
The two other models do not take into account any observed past performance information 
to inform their selections. They simply repeat the same behavior across all trials, regardless of any 
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feedback received. The naive random model assumes no pre-existing knowledge of financial markets, 
and simply chooses options at random, with each fund having a probability of 50% of being selected 
at every trial. The low-fee model expects that participants have some pre-existing knowledge of 
financial markets (or have been informed of it, for example, by a disclaimer), namely that the low-fee 
fund is always the best option to choose, and chooses the low-fee fund at every trial with probability 
100%. 
Modelling results 
All models were evaluated for their ability to predict the next choice ahead for each 
participant at every trial. The two competing models were fitted against participants’ data at individual 
level, to find the optimal value for the free parameters for each model for each participant. The models 
were fed the actual choices and past performance information observed for each participant. The 
modelling was done only on trials 2 to 60, to match the statistical analyses in the previous section. The 
model closer to the actual behavior for each participant was declared the best fitting model for that 
participant (more details in Appendix B). 
Model fitting results are in Table 2, which shows how many participants in each experimental 
condition had their behavior best fit by each model. Behavior from 46% of participants was fit better 
by the WSLS model, indicating that participants mostly followed a simple rule of choosing the winning 
fund from each previous trial. The RL model provided the best fit to 18% of participants. These 
participants employed a more sensible strategy of choosing the funds based on a longer period of past 
performance. This is a better strategy in terms of identifying the low-fee fund as the best option, as it 
reduces the short-term noise associated with the WSLS model. After enough observations, the RL 
model would predict choosing the low-fee fund more often given its low cost advantage. 
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
The low-fee model was the best fit for 23% of participants. These participants showed the 
best behavior for the task, which was selecting the low-fee fund all trials. However, this was behavior 
not distributed evenly across the experimental conditions. The low-fee fund fitted more participants 
in the social disclaimer condition (31%) than in the no disclaimer (20%) or the standard disclaimer 
conditions (22%), with a significant difference according to a contingency table (χ2(2)=18.11, p<.001). 
As observed in the statistical analyses, the social disclaimer helped more participants achieve the 
optimal behavior of choosing the low-fee fund most of the time. Those participants whose best fitting 
model was the low-fee model also had higher financial literacy than any of the other models (10.54 
compared to 8.34-8.88, all pairwise ps<.001). 
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The best fitting model, the WSLS model, confirms that participants persistently chased past 
performance from the most recent previous trial, instead of learning over time that the low-fee fund 
was better by accumulating performance over many trials, which would eventually reduce random 
noise. A similar preference for relying on short-term past performance in mutual fund decisions was 
observed by Rieskamp (2006). One of the reasons why individuals might prefer the WSLS strategy is 
because it reduces cognitive and working memory load, even if it leads to suboptimal behavior. This 
is another reason why a simple cue or instruction, such as the social disclaimer employed here, is 
important to shift behavior towards optimality in such a complex dynamic environment (Yechiam et 
al., 2001). However, any such instruction would have to fight against the individual’s natural tendency 
to react to past performance. 
Discussion 
The present results showed a number of consistent patterns between past performance and 
fee minimization in realistic mutual fund choices, across three experiments covering index and active 
mutual funds in a diverse pool of participants. We observed a past performance bias in the first trial, 
replicating previous findings using static accumulated historical past returns (Choi et al., 2010; Fisch & 
Wilkinson-Ryan, 2014; Mauck & Salzsieder, 2017). In the subsequent repeated-choice trials with 
dynamically generated returns, participants continued to chase past performance, frequently 
switching from fund to fund according to the winning fund in the previous trial. Moreover, across 
three experiments, the standard disclaimer "Past performance does not guarantee future results" 
failed to help participants to minimize fees, replicating the findings in Mercer et al. (2010). An 
alternative social disclaimer directly highlighting the advantages of fee minimization (from Newall & 
Parker, 2019) performed better, improving performance. These are key findings from the single-choice 
mutual fund selection literature which replicate with a repeated-choice design, despite participants 
having the opportunity to learn that chasing past performance is a futile strategy for reward 
maximization. 
Learning in noisy environments 
The dynamic repeated-choice design employed here allowed us to better explore novel 
mutual fund choice relationships and how learning occurs in noisy environments. The tendency to 
chase past performance somewhat lessened over the course of the task, as participants gradually 
learned to correctly minimize fees more often, although the detrimental past performance bias was 
not completely eliminated and was still present throughout the task. The magnitude by which one 
fund outperformed the other was a factor in determining the likelihood of that fund being selected: 
small differences in fund returns did not influence selections as strongly as large differences. Our 
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dynamic paradigm with stochastically generated returns also circumvented the previous experimental 
limitation of high-fee funds always performing better (which is also ecologically invalid, since on 
average the opposite is true); in our task, the high-fee fund only outperformed the low-fee fund 
around half of the time (net of fees), within-participants. Even though the same participants saw the 
funds randomly outperform each other from trial to trial, participants still chased past performance, 
without seemingly being able to identify the random-walk nature of returns. 
Our task employed randomly generated noise, which resulted in the high-fee fund 
outperforming the low-fee fund by large margins for some small number of participants, and this 
might have led them to believe that the winning fund was the better choice. This is the nature of 
stochastic noise and finite samples, and might also happen in real life, when one particular fund 
outperforms the competition during short periods of time, as a result of random luck (Bollen & Busse, 
2005). However, for the vast majority of participants, each fund outperformed the other roughly half 
of the time, which should be a realistic representation of any two randomly chosen funds. 
Participants might not have fully learned that chasing past performance was an inefficient 
strategy and that the low-fee fund was better, even after many repeated trials, because of poor signal-
to-noise ratios. In noisy environments, learning can be severely impaired (e.g., Ratcliff & Smith, 2010). 
This is because noise obscures the signal and increases uncertainty (“noise is a curse,” Gureckis & 
Love, 2009a). When noise is high, it can be more easily misinterpreted as part of the signal: individuals 
try to explain the noise as being part of the signal (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). This belief is also 
shown by individuals incorrectly incorporating noise into their forecasts when predicting trends in 
noisy environments (Harvey, 1995). They believe that a noisy forecast is more representative of the 
data from which it was generated. However, given the stochastic unpredictable nature of noise, any 
attempts to reproduce it would only lead to worse forecasts. Even when making one single forecast, 
which is what our participants needed to do, the quality of any single prediction deteriorates in noisier 
environments (Harvey et al., 1997). 
The observed behavior of chasing of past performance might be a reflection of the general 
tendency that individuals have to identify patterns in data, even when there are none, resulting in a 
phenomenal sensitivity to patterns resulting from uninformative random noise (Gaissmaier & 
Schooler, 2008; Plonsky & Erev, 2017; Yu & Cohen, 2009). By incorporating noise as part of the signal, 
individuals might be seduced by spurious patterns, believing that these can be exploited for their 
benefit. For example, investors might (incorrectly) believe that the funds that performed well recently 
employ better investment strategies, allowing them to continue to outperform their peers in the 
future. 
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For risky financial assets, random fluctuations in price (noise) are often much greater than the 
long-term trend (signal). For example, the S&P 500 market index during the period utilized in our task 
had an average monthly return of 0.75% with a standard deviation of 2.88%. The signal-to-noise ratio 
is further deteriorated when trying to identify the difference in management fees of two funds within 
the same asset class, which is an even smaller signal (in our task, this difference was 0.05% and 0.08% 
per month for the passive and active scenarios respectively). Given that differences in fees are much 
smaller than the difference in variance between funds, it can be particularly difficult to isolate the 
signal (that the low-fee fund is the better choice) from the random noise, especially with few 
observations (i.e., in the short-term). 
Cognitive modelling confirmed the statistical findings that individuals chase past performance 
after every trial. It showed that a heuristic WSLS model which decides solely on the basis of 
performance from the most recent previous trial explained behavior better than an RL model deciding 
based on all past available performance. A clear implication of this is that participants are choosing 
based mostly on short-term performance, and are more likely to be influenced by random noise. If 
individuals were selecting based on a longer horizon of past information looking further into the past, 
the noise would be reduced in relation to the signal, making it easier to observe that the low-fee fund 
outperformed the high-fee one. 
Identifying that the low-fee fund is the optimal choice is therefore not trivial, and in fact 
requires much more data than an average investor is likely to be able to access. Because most 
investors lack the ability to observe for themselves that low-cost funds are the optimal strategy in the 
long-run, it is important to properly inform investors of the ideal course of action to take. This is the 
aim of the social disclaimer presented here, which improved observed behavior as intended. The 
cognitive modelling analysis also confirmed that the social disclaimer led to an increase in participants 
selecting mostly from the low-fee fund, and in particular those with higher financial literacy. 
Prior experience and financial literacy as moderators 
The chasing of past performance was moderated by an interaction of two individual difference 
variables: participants’ prior experience with financial markets; and financial literacy. In the first trial, 
all participants chased past performance, regardless of financial experience or financial literacy. In 
subsequent trials, participants who had both previous financial experience and financial literacy 
showed a greater reduction in chasing of past performance. The combination of both factors appeared 
to be crucial: the improvement was not as pronounced for participants who had only experience or 
high financial literacy alone - both experience and knowledge were required. This is compatible with 
traditional theories of skill acquisition which propose that high performance in complex tasks can be 
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achieved via the combination of declarative learning (which can be measured by literacy tests) with 
procedural experience (Anderson, 1982). 
In fact, there was a detrimental effect of financial experience without financial literacy, in the 
way that the disclaimers influenced behavior. For participants who had prior experience and high 
financial literacy, both disclaimers were able to flatten the relationship between past performance 
and selections of the low-fee fund. In these cases, participants selected the low-fee fund almost 
exclusively. For participants with no prior experience, however, the standard disclaimer was not as 
effective, while the social disclaimer was still effective in shifting individuals towards the low-fee fund. 
The standard disclaimer had a perverse effect on experienced participants with low financial 
literacy, causing them to select more frequently from the more expensive fund. The standard 
disclaimer tells investors that past performance should not be taken into account when choosing funds 
but does not provide an alternative selection strategy. It is possible that investors with low financial 
literacy misunderstand the true negative relationship between fees and performance, as it is not 
uncommon for consumers to use high price as a proxy for quality (Rao, 2005). It seems that the 
standard disclaimer hurts in particular those individuals that are not as well-prepared to deal with 
investments; participants with low financial literacy were more susceptible to unnecessary over-
spending on fees. 
While we measured financial literacy as a moderator of the behavior observed here, 
Fernandes et al. (2014) argue that directly increasing financial literacy does not lead to better financial 
decisions. Instead, measurements of more general statistical numeracy have been proposed as the 
underlying drivers of financial behavior, such as the Berlin Numeracy Test (Estrada-Mejia et al., 2016; 
Ghazal et al., 2014). There is, as expected, a high correlation between financial literacy and general 
numeracy, mostly because the answer to some finance-related questions have numerical reasoning 
components (Soll et al., 2013). For example, statistical numeracy alone should be enough to 
understand that a 50% increase and a subsequent 50% decrease in stock prices result in negative 
overall results, without the need to understand the intricacies of the stock markets. Asking individuals 
to interpret these types of statements ("x% increase followed by x% decrease"), Newall (2016) has 
found that indeed numeracy can be a better predictor of understanding price movements than 
financial literacy. However, we would argue that, for mutual fund selections (or stock selections in 
general), statistical numeracy should help but would not suffice without financial literacy. This is 
because those who are financially literate are more likely to understand the counter-intuitive lack of 
relationship between past and future returns in financial markets, which cannot be explained by 
numerical reasoning alone. This hypothesis remains to be tested experimentally. 
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Real-world investment decisions 
Like previous mutual fund research, the present design simplified some aspects of real-world 
investing (Choi et al., 2010), which caveats the external validity of our findings. Participants actively 
chased the best performing fund, as switching between them was costless. Although mutual fund 
switching is seemingly costless in some retirement plans, such as the US’s Thrift Savings Plan, or the 
UK’s USS Pensions, fund switching is not frictionless and inevitably costs time and money, in terms of 
commissions, entry or exit fees, taxation, and administrative expenses. These switching costs may 
encourage investors to switch funds in real life less often than it was observed in our task. However, 
Barber et al. (2005) report an actual annual mutual fund turnover of 70%, which is still far higher than 
an optimal buy-and-hold strategy. 
In our experiments, participants were exposed to repeated trials representing sixty months of 
returns, but completed the task in a much shorter space of time - actual re-investment decisions will 
span longer periods of times and not be made in quick succession. At every trial, participants were 
required to make a forced investment choice, without the possibility of keeping their money 
uninvested (i.e., not investing in either fund). Given the random nature of market price movements, 
being able to divest is not beneficial to overall performance, as investors cannot reliably determine 
when an asset price is going down in order to avoid losses. As a result, choosing the low-fee fund 
would remain the behavior that maximizes expected rewards in a task which allows being uninvested. 
Research has shown that given the option to divest from the market, individuals actually tend to sell 
winners early and hang on to losers for too long, further amplifying their losses (the “disposition 
effect,” Shefrin & Statman, 1985). The disposition effect seems to be reduced, but not completely 
eliminated, with more sophisticated investors (Dhar & Zhu, 2006; Shapira & Venezia, 2001). It is likely 
that allowing for divestments would magnify the influence of financial experience and financial literacy 
observed in our task. Another possibility that was not tested in our task was that of inertia through 
inaction. With real-life investments, individuals can choose to leave their investments untouched over 
many periods, without being constantly prompted to buy or sell any assets. Inaction inertia in financial 
decisions reduces trading (Tykocinski et al., 1995, 2004) and is likely to limit chasing behavior. Future 
research should explore this hypothesis. 
However, while the limitations above are valid in relation to more traditional ways in which 
investments are accessed, they might no longer apply, and in fact our paradigm might even more 
closely match new emerging ways of investing: A new breed of smartphone-based investment 
platforms are substantially changing the way that individuals make investments (Stewart, 2020). First, 
these platforms often offer low minimum investments, easy convenient access and costless trading, 
reducing many of the barriers that would otherwise limit excessive trading described above. Second, 
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they often provide users with prompts and notifications to entice frequent portfolio checking and 
further trading, reducing inertia through inaction (Zweig, 2020). Furthermore, there appears to be a 
trend towards the "gamblification" of trading, with the aim of transforming it into an addictive activity 
similar to gambling (Mosenhauer et al., 2021). The influence of social media, bringing individuals who 
acquire large gains from random lucky investments into the spotlight, while those with similar 
strategies but who incur losses not being as well publicized, might lead to investors mimicking 
inefficient behavior. Such social influences can be in direct conflict with the social disclaimer tested 
here and compromise its efficacy for nudging behavior in the right direction. 
With regards to financial rewards, in our experiments selecting the low-fee fund would impart 
relatively small absolute monetary advantages, with the experiments simulating a US$10 initial 
investment compared to the median amount invested in a mutual fund of US$37,500 in the US 
(Investment Company Institute, 2019), despite a non-negligible advantage in earnings (7% in 
Experiments 1a and 2 and 13% in Experiment 1b). Because the task was completed relatively quickly 
in around 10 minutes, the average pro-rata payment was respectable at approximately US$40/hour, 
with those who exclusively selected the low-fee fund receiving an extra US$2-3/hour than those who 
never did. Nonetheless, despite much higher financial incentives in Choi et al. (2010), participants still 
failed to minimize fees, and studies of mutual fund flows have confirmed that laboratory studies of 
fund selection replicate in the field (Barber et al., 2005; Sirri & Tufano, 1998). 
Another simplification we employed is that in the real markets individuals have to choose 
between a myriad of different fund across different asset classes, with a much wider range of 
information provided to investors, creating a much more complex decision environment. Research 
has shown how increasing environmental complexity can lead to an even greater use of heuristics 
such as simplification strategies to reduce the amount of information and help facilitate decision-
making (Payne, 1976; Payne et al., 1988). If individuals are employing simplification strategies in our 
streamlined laboratory task (such as relying on recent past performance), then it is even more likely 
that they will need to adopt simple strategies and discard information when facing the complexities 
of the real markets. The ability to identify the best alternative should deteriorate in more complex 
tasks, as complexity increases how much individuals disregard warnings and disclaimers (Weiss-Cohen 
et al., 2018). Furthermore, we would expect the contribution of experience and literacy to be 
amplified: those individuals who know that past performance is a poor indicator should not be 
affected as much, but those who do not understand this are even more likely to rely on past 
performance. We believe that in complex environments the impact of more efficient disclaimers will 
be even greater, such as the social disclaimer used here. 
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Designing more efficient disclaimers 
Because of the high noise, weak signal, and counter-intuitive relationships between short and 
long-term goals, investing in mutual fund is a very difficult decision. Providing decision cues have been 
shown to improve behavior in similarly difficult-to-learn tasks with high noise and short-term benefits 
in conflict with long-term goals (Gureckis & Love, 2009b). However, using behavioral and 
computational analyses, we observed that the standard disclaimer does not reduce the inefficient 
chasing of past performance, despite specifically stating that "past performance does not guarantee 
future returns." 
We believe that the standard disclaimer does not help behavior because it attempts to 
eliminate past performance as a decision cue, but it does not provide an alternative cue to guide 
behavior. Simply verbalizing characteristics of a complex system, as the traditional disclaimer does, 
does not seem to help improve performance (Brehmer & Kuylenstierna, 1978). Instead, guided 
instructions and external cues, which identify winning strategies, are needed to help shape behavior 
in complex environments with misleading local maxima (Fu & Anderson, 2008; Yechiam et al., 2001). 
Exploring probability matching in sequential choices, D. J. Koehler and James (2010) suggest that a 
simpler strategy similar to chasing past performance comes more readily to mind, while the 
alternative maximizing strategy does not; however, once the superior strategy is brought to mind, 
more participants subsequently engage in maximizing. This was the aim of the social disclaimer. 
Another reason might be that the standard disclaimer fails to break the perceived subjective 
relationship between past and future performance. Stating that past performance does not guarantee 
future returns does not completely dissociate the two, because of the perceived vagueness of verbal 
statistical phrases (Wallsten et al., 1986). Subjective perceptions of probabilistic relationships are 
typically less extreme than intended, especially when provided verbally instead of numerically 
(Budescu et al., 2009; Fillenbaum et al., 1991). Individuals might perhaps believe that there is a 
(potentially still strong) relationship, but it is stochastic, instead of deterministic. The allure of 
identifying a recurring pattern within randomness is likely to be too great to be dispelled by a simple 
disclaimer stating that there are no patterns (D. J. Koehler & James, 2010; Shanks et al., 2002). Any 
suspicion of a pattern in high noise might be perceived as potential signals of non-randomness in price 
movements (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Lopes, 1982), leading individuals to more easily dismiss the 
standard disclaimer of no auto-correlation. In addition, direct personal experience can easily 
overcome implausible verbally described information, such as warnings, instructions, or cues (Weiss-
Cohen et al., 2016). This is because experience is more personal, visceral, and intuitive, while verbal 
descriptions are more cognitively demanding to process and understand (Lejarraga, 2010). An efficient 
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disclaimer aiming to influence behavior should reduce complexity, avoid ambiguity, and provide clear 
and easy-to-follow instructions (Argo & Main, 2004). 
As a replacement to the traditional disclaimer, we employed instead a social disclaimer, which 
succeeds in reducing the chasing of past performance, and shifting investors towards the low-fee fund. 
We believe the social disclaimer influences behavior because it provides a clear, direct, and plausible 
guide as to how to make investment choices ("funds with low fees have the highest future results"). 
The social disclaimer specifically highlights low-fees as the optimal choice criterion in lieu of past 
performance. The social disclaimer also engages social nudging via social comparison and social 
norming (Osman et al., 2020). Neuroimaging research has shown that investors prefer to correlate 
their behaviors with the actions of others (Lohrenz et al., 2013), and that such social nudging can 
increase the subjective value of choices selected by others (Chung et al., 2015). By using a social 
comparison nudge, we might have provided the necessary differentiating factor that gives the low-fee 
fund the advantage it needs to be selected in an environment which is otherwise too noisy to allow 
for easy identification of the optimal choice. 
While the social disclaimer’s link between fees and future performance was true in this task 
given that both funds invested in the same assets, caution should be applied to the design of warning 
labels for funds spanning across different asset classes. The social disclaimer tested here is one 
example of how the advice currently given to investors could be improved, especially given the 
complex and counter-intuitive nuances of the financial markets. Future research should continue to 
explore rival disclaimers that might be even better, as well as alternative financial behavior change 
interventions (Chin & de Bruin, 2019; Sims et al., 2020). As Fischhoff (1998) stated, "one should no 
more release an untested communication than an untested drug" (p. 70). 
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Appendix A Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) results 
Table A1 contains the ANOVA results of the linear regressions used in the main statistical 
analyses, using the treatment contrast for disclaimer and after mean-centering the continuous 
variables. The pre-registered ANOVA table, using a Helmert contrast and raw untransformed variables, 
is nearly indistinguishable from the one below, as these changes affect the scale and magnitude 
coefficients of the regressions, but not their variance (the pre-registered ANOVA tables are in OSF). 
Two p-values changed at the third decimal figure, which does not affect any of the conclusions. As 
preregistered, these are Type-II ANOVA results, which means that the main effects are estimated in 
isolation from their interactions. This is a different approach to a regression table, which considers the 
main effects after controlling for their interactions (similar to a Type-III ANOVA), therefore the 
significance of the main effects might differ. However, none of the conclusions would change if we 
extracted our results solely from these ANOVA tables instead of the regression tables used in the main 
manuscript, as the interpretation of the results remain the same. 
 
[TABLE A1 HERE] 
Appendix B Cognitive modelling 
Because the task employed in the current research involved a binary choice between two 
options, the models only needed to estimate the probability of selecting one of the funds at each trial, 
as the probability for choosing the other fund could be simply extracted as the compliment of the 
modelled probability. We therefore define all the models around the probability of choosing the low-
fee fund, Pr[Flow(t)]. 
B.1 The two base models 
The random model chooses each fund at time t with probability 50%, therefore the probability 
of selecting the low-fee fund is always: 
Pr[Flow(t)] = 0.5. 
The low-fee fund model chooses the low-fee fund at time t always with probability 100%: 
Pr[Flow(t)] = 1. 
B.2 Reinforcement learning model 
The expectancy-valence (EV) delta-rule reinforcement learning model uses all past available 
information when choosing a fund (Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005). It has two free parameters, φ and 
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θ, described below. The model starts by updating the expectancy value of each fund j (low-fee or high-
fee) at every trial t, Ej(t), as follows: 
 
Ej(t) = Ej(t − 1) + φ · [rj(t) − Ej(t − 1)], 
 
where rj(t) is the observed return (past performance) of fund j at time t, and φ is the free learning 
parameter, which is allowed to vary between zero and one. For values of φ closer to zero, the model 
gives relatively equal weight to all observations, while for values closer to one, the model gives higher 
weights to more recent observations. The expectancies start at zero in the first trial. 
After the expectancies are updated, the model chooses the low-fee fund at trial t according 
to a soft-max ratio choice rule which chooses the low-fee fund in accordance to the relative ratio of 




𝑒$⋅&!"#(() + 𝑒$⋅&$%&$(()	, 
 
where θ is the choice sensitivity free parameter, (0 ≤ θ ≤ 5). If θ = 0, the model randomly guesses 
between the expectancies regardless of their values, while higher values of θ will lead to more 
deterministic maximization behavior. 
B.3 Win-stay-lose-shift model 
The win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) model uses only the information from the previous trial when 
choosing the fund for the next trial. The model selects the fund in trial t according to: (a) the fund 
selected in trial t − 1; (b) if the selected fun had higher (win) or lower returns (loss) than the other 
fund at trial t − 1; and (c) two free parameters, the probability to stay with the same fund given a win 
(Pr[stay|win]) and the probability to shift to the other fund given a loss (Pr[shift|loss]), both of which 
ranged from zero to one. 
To parametrize the above mechanism, the probability of staying with the low-fee fund in trial 
t, after having selected it in trial t − 1, given that the low-fee fund "won" in comparison to the high-
fee fund in trial t − 1, is defined as: 
 
Pr[Flow(t) | δ(t − 1) = 1 & rlow(t − 1) > rhigh(t − 1)] = Pr[stay|win], 
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where δ(t − 1) is equal to one if the low-fee fund was chosen in trial t − 1, zero if the high-fee fund was 
chosen (in this case, the low-fee fund was chosen), and rlow(t-1) and rhigh(t-1) are the returns of the 
low-fee and high-fee fund in the previous trial, respectively. 
The probability of shifting away from the low-fee fund in trial t (i.e., choosing the high-fee 
fund), after having selected it in trial t − 1, given that the low-fee fund "lost" in comparison to the high-
fee fund in trial t − 1, is defined as: 
 
Pr[Fhigh(t) | δ(t − 1) = 1 & rlow(t − 1) < rhigh(t − 1)] = Pr[shift|loss]. 
B.4 Model evaluation and results 
The competitor RL and WSLS models were fitted against the observed experimental behavior 
at individual level using a one-step-ahead prediction method (Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2008; Yechiam 
& Ert, 2007). We used the matrices of actual returns observed for each individual, and the arrays of 
choices they made (in order to determine if they were shifting or staying with their previous choice 
for the WSLS model), at each trial, and predicted the next trial. To keep the cognitive modelling 
analysis consistent with the statistical analysis of trials 2-60, we also restricted the cognitive modelling 
to only those trials, excluding the first trial. We used the genoud optimization function (Mebane & 
Sekhon, 2011) in R, and the free parameters were evaluated in increments of 0.001. Model predictions 
were compared against observed human behavior using log-likelihood minimization: 
 





where Pr[Flow(t)] is the probability of selecting the low-fee fund at trial t, and δ(t) is equal to one if the 
low-fee fund was chosen in trial t, zero if the high-fee fund was chosen. As the logarithm of zero is 
minus infinity, we restricted Pr[Flow(t)] to a minimum of 0.001 and a maximum of 0.999. 
In order to compare the models, we used Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) weights 
(Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004), which penalizes the two decision models for having more parameters 
(two) than the base models (zero). The winning fund was the one with the lowest AIC: 
 
AIC = −2LL + 2k, 
 
where k is the number of parameters in the model. In our case, it was either zero (for the two simpler 
models) or two (for the competitor models). The mean AIC for each model (lower is better), and the 
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mean best fitting parameters for each competitor model are show in Table B1 (the individual best 
fitting parameters and AIC for each participant for each model are in OSF). Both competitor models 
had lower AIC than the random model, although it is clear that the WSLS model was the winner overall. 
The low-fee fund appear to have done poorly, because it did not fit the behavior of most participants, 
but for 23% of participants it fitted behavior the best, with the lowest AIC for those individuals. The 
random model’s AIC has no deviance because the LL is the same for all participants, due to the 50/50 
random behavior it predicts. 
 
[TABLE B1 HERE] 
Appendix C Instructions 
Reproduced below are the full set of instructions for the experiments, which were displayed 
before the task started. The first and last items were removed after the first selection was made, but 
the remaining six middle items remained on screen throughout the main fund selection task. Italics as 
in the original. 
The instructions differed slightly between the experiments. For Experiments 1a and 2, they 
were based on passive funds which closely match the index: 
• Two buttons will be shown below. They represent two mutual funds in which you can 
invest. Mutual funds are used to invest in a diversified manner. They pool the money of many 
investors together to buy many individual assets. 
• The two funds below are very similar. Both invest in all S&P 500 stocks, which are the 
500 largest companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Their aim is the same: to match 
the S&P 500 index as closely as possible. 
• You will be asked to choose between the two funds for many months. Returns shown 
are based on actual historical monthly data from the S&P 500 index. You should aim to 
maximize your returns, to get a higher bonus. 
• Mutual funds charge management fees, shown below each fund as % of total assets 
charged per year. You pay the fees shown to invest in each fund, regardless of performance. 
• After each choice you make, returns for that month will be shown, net of fees (after 
fees have been taken off), for both funds. 1/12 of the annual fees are deducted from the 
returns every month. 
• The returns from the fund you choose will accumulate towards your bonus. Each 
month’s positive returns will be added, and negative returns will be taken off. You will get $1 
in bonus for every 10% accumulated. 
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• At the start, you will also be shown the previous historical returns for each fund for 
the one year period before you can start investing in each fund. These will not be added to 
your bonus. 
For Experiment 1b the instructions were changed slightly to reflect that the funds are active 
funds. The second and third items were changed to the ones below, while the other items remained 
the same: 
• The two funds below are similar. Both actively invest in selected S&P 500 stocks, which 
are the 500 largest companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Their aim is the same: 
to outperform the S&P 500 index by as much as possible. 
• You will be asked to choose between the two funds for many months. Returns shown 
are based on actual historical monthly data. You should aim to maximize your returns, to get 
a higher bonus. 
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A) Before first trial         B) After first trial 
 
Figure 1. Screenshots in the standard disclaimer condition of Experiment 1a. (A) Before the first trial, 
with historical past returns displayed. (B) After the first selection has been made. In this example the 
participant has chosen Fund A. The positioning of the funds was randomized, shown here with the low-
fee fund on the left and the high-fee fund on the right. 
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A) Experiment 1a: Experienced investors and index-tracking funds 
 
B) Experiment 1b: Experienced investors and actively managed funds 
 
C) Experiment 2: Inexperienced investors and index-tracking funds 
 
Figure 2. Experimental results according to disclaimer and financial literacy. The differences shown 
were calculated as returns from the low-fee fund minus the high-fee fund at each period. Positive 
values equate to the low-fee fund outperforming the high-fee fund by that amount. The slope of the 
curves represent chasing of past performance: the steeper the slope, the more participants’ 
behaviors were sensitive to past performance. 
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Table 1. Regression coefficients (log-odds) of the different analyses (standard errors in brackets). 
Trial number, financial literacy scores, and difference in returns are mean-centered. Trial numbered 
was also divided by 100. The difference in returns for the first trial analyses (A) are the differences in 
12-month historical returns, while for the subsequent trial analyses (B) they are the differences in 
returns in the previous trial. Positive differences indicate that the low-fee fund outperformed the 
high-fee fund. The disclaimer coefficients are shown in relation to the control condition of no-
disclaimer (treatment contrast coding). 
 
 Selections from Low-fee Fund 
 (A) First Trial (B) Subsequent trials 
 Exp. 1a Exp. 1b Exp. 2 Exp. 1a Exp. 1b Exp. 2 
Trial number (÷ 100)    1.03*** 0.60*** 0.80*** 
    (0.34) (0.23) (0.21) 
Disclaimer=social  0.78** 1.01***  0.98*** 1.48*** 
  (0.36) (0.31)  (0.25) (0.19) 
Disclaimer=standard -0.14 -0.30 -0.10 0.22 -0.05 0.02 
 (0.34) (0.30) (0.25) (0.28) (0.25) (0.18) 
Difference in returns 18.82*** 19.62*** 13.30*** 7.02*** 2.89*** 8.97*** 
 (3.12) (2.83) (2.35) (0.95) (0.71) (0.81) 
Financial literacy 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.16* 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) 
Discl.=social × Difference  -10.69*** -5.20  0.50 -5.81*** 
  (3.52) (3.35)  (1.04) (1.26) 
Discl.=standard × Difference -9.31** -10.07*** -9.20*** -5.45*** 3.52*** -2.18* 
 (3.78) (3.37) (2.96) (1.30) (0.99) (1.15) 
Discl.=social × Fin. Lit.  0.04 -0.01  0.20* 0.19*** 
  (0.12) (0.09)  (0.10) (0.06) 
Discl.=standard × Fin. Lit. 0.14 0.005 -0.04 0.27*** 0.11 0.02 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) 
Difference × Fin. Lit. 0.92 0.66 0.10 -0.73*** -0.60*** 0.25 
 (0.62) (0.47) (0.44) (0.24) (0.16) (0.18) 
Constant 1.87*** 1.38*** 1.05*** 1.62*** 1.34*** 0.66*** 
 (0.26) (0.24) (0.19) (0.22) (0.18) (0.14) 
Participants 400 599 596 400 599 596 
Observations 400 599 596 23,600 35,341 35,164 
R2 0.24 0.30 0.15 0.78 0.70 0.66 
Note: *p<.10; **p<.05;***p<.01 
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Table 2. Model fitting results. Number of participants in each condition which best fit each cognitive 
model (percentages of columns in brackets). The best fitting model overall was the WSLS model. The 
social disclaimer significantly increased the number of participants best fitting the low-fee model. 
 
 Disclaimer 
Model None Standard Social Total 
Random model 82 70 43 195 
 (14%) (12%) (11%) (12%) 
Low-fee model 118 132 123 373 
 (20%) (22%) (31%) (23%) 
RL model 108 125 60 293 
 (18%) (21%) (15%) (18%) 
WSLS model 294 269 171 734 
 (49%) (45%) (43%) (46%) 
Total 602 596 397 1595 
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Table A1. Type-II ANOVA tables of the linear regressions used in the main statistical analyses. This 
table shows the result using treatment contrasts for the variable Disclaimer, and mean-centering the 
variables Difference and Financial Literacy. 
 
 Experiment 1a Experiment 1b Experiment 2 
 χ2 df p χ2 df p χ2 df p 
First trial          
Disclaimer  0.79 1 .375 26.57 2 <.001 21.48 2 <.001 
Difference in returns  76.83 1 <.001 146.54 1 <.001 53.87 1 <.001 
Financial literacy  1.95 1 .163 4.66 1 .031 1.00 1 .317 
Disclaimer × Difference 6.46 1 .011 13.08 2 .001 10.29 2 .006 
Disclaimer × Fin. Lit.  1.96 1 .162 0.14 2 .933 0.20 2 .906 
Difference × Fin. Lit.  2.12 1 .145 1.94 1 .163 0.05 1 .822 
Subsequent trials          
Trial number  9.03 1 .003 6.84 1 .009 13.88 1 <.001 
Disclaimer  0.50 1 .480 21.15 2 <.001 79.83 2 <.001 
Difference in returns  51.93 1 <.001 121.52 1 <.001 174.91 1 <.001 
Financial literacy  18.68 1 <.001 38.35 1 <.001 17.44 1 <.001 
Disclaimer × Difference 17.43 1 <.001 14.69 2 .001 21.19 2 <.001 
Disclaimer × Fin. Lit.   6.79 1 .009 3.88 2 .144 10.68 2 .005 
Difference × Fin. Lit.  9.47 1 .002 14.10 1 <.001 1.91 1 .167 
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Table B1. Best fit parameters for the competitor models, and AIC results (lower is better). Mean and 
SD for all participants, and for those participants for whom each model was the best fitting one. 
 
  All participants Best fitting 
Model  Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
RL Learning Rate: φ 0.20 (0.31) 0.19 (0.29) 
 Choice sensitivity: θ 2.66 (2.16) 3.04 (1.93) 
 Model fit: AIC 72.79 (17.12) 66.60 (13.77) 
WSLS Pr[Stay | Win] 0.78 (0.22) 0.76 (0.22) 
 Pr[Shift | Loss] 0.29 (0.24) 0.31 (0.23) 
 Model fit: AIC 51.67 (30.75) 56.68 (22.56) 
Low-fee Model fit: AIC 278.69 (232.90) 3.56 (8.03) 
Random Model fit: AIC 81.79 (0) 81.79 (0) 
 
